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THE RACE TO OLIGOPOLY
JAMES McI. HENDERSON-
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON**
The recent significant increase in merger activity among the nation's
large industrial corporations has become the subject of considerable
concern. This article examines current developments in the merger
area and appraises their effect upon the continuance of the competi-
tive system. The authors view the implications of this merger trend
against the backdrop of existing legislative controls, and posit guide-
lines for additional antitrust legislation to halt the "race to oligopoly."
THE MERGER FEVER
M ERGER FEVER is evident in all areas of American industry.1 So
frequently are corporate mergers occurring that it is unusual to scan
the financial pages of a metropolitan newspaper without sighting an item
announcing an impending or completed merger.2 Not only are mergers
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I Compare FTC, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MANUFACTURING CORPORA-
TIONS (1st Quarter 1961) with FTC, QUARTERLY FINANcIAL REPORT FOR MANU-
FAcTRING CORPORATIONS (1st Quarter 1967).
2 Examples of recent merger reports: Westinghouse agrees to acquire Aeroquip
Corp., Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1967, at 1, col. 2; Allis-Chalmers, Signal Oil
merger agreed by boards, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 1967, at 1, col. 2; Diamond
Alkali and Shamrock Gas and Oil Co. merge, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1967, at
11, col. 2; Tops chain of 16 restaurants in the D.C. area will merge into A-G Foods,
Inc., of Philadelphia, Washington Post, Dec. 13, 1967, at C8, col. 2; Monticello Na-
tional Bank, Charlottesville, and First Virginia Bankshares Corp., of Arlington, will
become affiliated, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1967, at f2, col. 2; Bunker-Ramo Corp.
is having preliminary merger discussions with Chicago-based Ampheno Corp., Wash-
ington Post, Dec. 13, 1967, at c9, col. 2; The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., has
acquired Fisher-Stevens, Inc., Washington Post, Jan. 5, 1968, at d6, col. 1; Dynatech
is to acquire Cooke Engineering, Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1968, at d6, col. 4;
"Investment Firms Are Riding Merrily With Mergers Tide," Washington Post,
Feb. 18, 1968, at fl, col. 3; "Merger Parade Pace Quickened; Month's Deals at $1.8
Billion"--and: "there is increasing demand for predictability in determining whether
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increasing numerically,3 but the entire trend is beginning to resemble an
octopus-stretching downward (vertical integration), upward (reverse
vertical integration), sideways (horizontal integration) and variable in
all directions (conglomerate integration).
The economic impact of the current merger movement on the status
and future of small business in the United States cannot be minimized
since the level of economic concentration in American industry has con-
tinued to rise at an ominous rate. For example, Dr. Willard F. Mueller,
Director of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission,
recently reported to the Senate Select Committee on Small Business that
[o]ver the period [1947-1963] the top 200 [manufacturing corporations]
expanded their share [of total manufacturing assets] from 30 percent
to 41 percent, or by over one-third. . . Since 1958 the rate of increase
has been 0.6 percent a year. By 1963 the 100 largest held a greater share
than was held by the 200 largest in 1947, and the 50 largest held a
greater share than the 100 largest in 1947.
Other FTC statistics indicate that between 1961 and 1967, corporations
of one billion dollars in assets and over have increased their control of
total assets of all manufacturing corporations from 28 percent to 38 per-
cent.5 To the extent that these increasing concentrations of economic
power continue apace, American industry is speeding dangerously down
the road to oligopoly. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is sub-
stantial disquietude in both the press and Congress over the ever increas-
ing number of mergers by big business. 6
a merger will violate the antitrust laws." MEROERS & ACQUISITIONS MONTHLY, Nov.,
1967, at 1.
'See J. Henderson & W. Henderson, Will a Zaibatsu Control Our Economy?,
26 FED. BJ. 187 (1966).
'Statement of Dr. Willard F. Mueller, Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal
Trade Commission, Before Select Committee on Small Business, U.S. Senate, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., March 15, 1967.
1 See FTC, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS
(1st Quarter 1967).
'A Washington Post editorial tells of the "Merger That Wasn't" between the
American Broadcasting Companies and the International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation. According to the Post, the fact that the proposed merger did not
occur "represents an antitrust victory of the first magnitude .... A great deal of
harm and virtually no good would have come from a consummated IT-ABC mer-
ger." Washington Post, Jan. 4, 1968, at 16a, col. 2.
In December, 1967, Senator Mike Mansfield urged the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee to investigate and halt a merger between the Great Northern; Northern Pa-
cific; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy; Pacific Coast, Spokane, Portland and Seattle
railroad lines which had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
and another group of Senators was so disturbed by the Commission's approval of this
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IMPACT OF THE CELLER-KEFAUVER ACT
The Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act7 has
become a strong antimerger weapon of the FTC and the Department of
Justice, the agencies primarily responsible for enforcement of the anti-
trust laws. The enactment of section 7 opened so vast an array of new
legal horizons that it would be difficult to overemphasize its importance
to the effort to stem the flood of corporate mergers.
Prior to the enactment of section 7, mergers could be attacked under
the Sherman Act if their consequences resulted in a restraint of trade
proscribed by that act,8 and divestiture was an appropriate remedy. 9 The
Supreme Court has interpreted section 7, however, as proscribing mergers
even though their consequences may not attain the proportions of full-
fledged Sherman Act violations, 10 reasoning that the purpose and reach
of the section was to stop the anticompetitive consequences that almost
invariably succeed a merger of large enterprises in their incipiency."
Moreover, the Court recognized "a duty ourselves to be sure" that an
effective decree is fashioned. 12
The Supreme Court has also taken a broad approach to what con-
stitutes a relevant geographical or product market in both free and regu-
lated industries.' 3 A realistic and pragmatic test is utilized in both market
situations, with virtually the same factors being applied to each. In
Brown Shoe Company v. United States,'4 for example, the Court explained
merger that legislation, S. 2822, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), was introduced by
Senator Lee Metcalf to "subject all not-yet-consummated railroad mergers, even
those approved by the ICC, to the antitrust laws until new merger standards are
enacted." BurEAu oF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, ANTITusT AND TRADE REGULATION RE-
PORT No. 336 (1967).
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
'See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964).
See Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 (1922); United States
v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 226 U.S.
470 (1913). See also authorities cited in United States v. El. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 366 U.S. 316, 329 (1961), and see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563 (1966).
"'See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
"United States v. E.. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
2 Id. at 327-30.
11United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
1" 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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that the criteria for determining the appropriate geographic market "are
essentially similar to those used to determine the revelant product market
[and must]... correspond to the commercial realities of the situation."'Is
While stating that "[tlhe outer boundaries of a product market are de-
termined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity
of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it,"u6 the Court
held that
within this broad market... submarkets may exist which... constitute
product markets for antitrust purposes. .. . The boundaries of such a
submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as
industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic
entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production
facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes,
and specialized vendors. 17
Thus, in United States v. Pabst Brewing Company' s the Court was able
to hold that the "probable effect of the merger on competition" was suf-
ficient to fall within the prohibitions of section 7 in Wisconsin (where the
merging companies accounted for 23.95 percent of product sales), in the
three-state area of Wisconsin, fllinois and Michigan (where the merging
companies accounted for 11.32 percent of product sales) and in the entire
country (where the merging companies accounted for only 4.49 percent
of product sales).19
Another Supreme Court decision lending support to the FTC in its
battle to stem the merger tide is FTC v. Dean Foods Corporation.20  In
that case it was held that a court of appeals may issue a preliminary in-
junction to prevent the consummation of a proposed merger upon a show-
ing by the FTC that a remedial order would be virtually impossible once
the merger was completed.21  The Department of Justice 22 and private
litigants,23 of course, are expressly authorized by the Celler-Kefauver Act
to seek such injunctive relief in the United States district courts.
Ir Id. at 336.
"Old. at 325.
'I Id. (emphasis supplied).
18 384 U.S. 546 (1965).
"See id. at 551-52.
20 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
" Id. at 605.
2P15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964).
" 15 U.s.c. § 26 (1964).
[Vol. 1968: 637
INADEQUACY OF PRESENT LAWS TO FORESTALL OLIGOPOLY
AND PRESERVE COMPETITION AND SMALL BUSINESS
Despite the aid of the Celler-Kefauver Act and enlightened decisions
by the Supreme Court, the efforts of government agencies to stem the in-
creasingly high tidal wave of business mergers are woefully insufficient.
Oligopoly injects multiple anticompetitive problems into our economy
which may well be beyond the control capacity of those agencies charged
with safeguarding the competitive system. Even the ancient, publicly
condemned, per se anticompetitive practice of horizontal price fixing
presents difficult litigation problems when practiced by those who reign
over oligopolistic industrial empires. When control of a major industry is
in the hands of a few it is easy to become sophisticated in avoiding the
price-fixing pitfall. Thus, concrete evidence of the practice is difficult to
obtain and enforcement agencies and private treble-damage action plain-
tiffs must wage their battle against horizontal price fixing on tenuous dis-
tinctions between "price fixing!' and "price conformance," and the eviden-
tiary weight of "conscious parallelism. '24 For this reason even horizontal
price fixing actions require protracted litigation, especially when they
involve an oligopolistic empire. In some industries the problem of price
fixing may even now be beyond the capacity of any agency or private liti-
gant to handle effectively. The steel and automotive industries, for example,
appear to be so oligopolistic and so sophisticated in circumventing the
Sherman Act, that it has become necessary to deal with their pricing
practices (and other practices involving the public interest) at the presi-
dential or congressional level. 25
Oligopoly also assures the easy descent of vertical integration from
the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer. When vertical integration is
attempted by merger it can be challenged, of course, under section 7 of
the Clayton Act.26 This method of attack, however, involves such diffi-
cult problems as whether or not the merger substantially affects competi-
tion or tends to create a monopoly, as well as definition of the revelant
2' See United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (price-fix-
ing charge waived); United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964); Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); Orbo Theatre Corp. v.
Loews, Inc., 261 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959);
Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
'5 See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (Supp. 1967).
"0 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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product or geographical market.27 And when franchising is the vehicle
for vertical integration, section 7 is not even applicable, and the assailant
must fall back on the Sherman Act.28 The Supreme Court, however, in
White Motor Company v. United States,29 provided some answers con-
cerning the limitations on franchise agreements. In essence, the Court
held that when such agreements involve vertical (or horizontal) price fix-
ing, they per se violate the Sherman Act.30 Yet the Court declined to rule
on whether or not a vertical cartel arrangement constitutes a per se viola-
tion of the Act,31 although it had already held in Timken Roller Bearing
Company v. United States32 that a horizontal cartel arrangement was such
a violation. The Court's reluctance to reach a similar conclusion, as to
vertical arrangements, probably resulted from the fact that the case had
reached it based upon a summary judgment which presented only the
"bare bones of the documentary evidence. 33 Finally, when vertical inte-
gration is accomplished by the manufacturer establishing his own ultimate
consumer outlets, the only practical weapon of attack is the monopoly
provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act.3 4 The number and com-
plexity of the problems involved in such litigation is too well known to
require citation of authority.
The peril to small business by vertical integration ac,,mplished either
by merger or direct vertical expansion is obvious. Indeed, one of the pur-
poses of the Sherman Act was to provide a haven for small business.35
If left unchecked, oligopolistic industries could through vertical integration
(either by merger or internal expansion) almost completely dislodge small
business from our competitive system.36 Even if vertical integration is
accomplished by franchising, when mammoth enterprises are involved a
serious question often arises as to whether the franchisee (prima facie
an independent business) is not in fact a captive middleman of the fran-
chisor, since the balance of economic power is heavily weighed in favor
27 See note 13 supra.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
20372 U.S. 253 (1963).
3
0 Id. at 263.
31Id.
22341 U.S. 593 (1951). See also Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
1.372 U.S. at 261.
"1 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
"See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1959).
'0 See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Select Committee on
Small Business, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 5, at 1038, 1077 (1963).
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of the latter.37 Oligopolistic enterprises, by coupling vertical integration
with dual distribution, have the power to destroy the middleman, either
by raising the middleman's prices or lowering prices to his competitors.
That such practices have been of deep concern to middlemen is demon-
strated by the protracted congressional hearings which have been held on
this subject.38 It is difficult, however, to devise legislative remedies to
protect intermediate distributors against the oppressive tactics of an oligo-
polistic industry short of a legislative proscription relating to business size.
Legislation was introduced which is calculated to aid the middleman
by controlling the prices of franchisors engaged in dual distribution.39
The ultimate result of such legislation, however, is to provide the govern-
ment with authority to fix the prices of the franchisor; and government
price fixing, except in regulatory areas clearly required in the public in-
terest or during periods of extreme national emergency, is, in the author's
opinion, inconsistent with a truly competitive economic system.
The growth of oligopolistic industries also results from the encom-
passing of lesser industries within the orbit of control, through either
conglomerate acquisitions or interlocking directorates and management.
The existence of economic empires of this type invites the exercise of the
competitive advanitaiges of reciprocity,4 and deceptive practices in an
oligopolistic empire can be considerably more difficult to detect and
combat. Ownership may change but brand names and company names
may or may not, and the buying public may believe that different com-
panies are waging a competitive war when such is not the case. Different
brands of soap, for example, may appear to be competing, each huckster
declaiming that his soap will make clothes whiter and brighter, when in
fact both "competitors" are owned by the same enterprise and the com-
''!"v"m n7- q--nj r ipT . A ijrl-nt ctnri-k nrhnte
D brandbrn
by the.'ire
nation
.Ec. 1168
M57, 113 (al
ms to be (daily, .
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To wage sufficient legal battles to stem the increasing flood of mergers
now endangering our competitive system on the sophisticated lines delin-
eated by our current antitrust laws appears to present an impossible task.
The litigation required takes too long and the number of mergers are too
many. This is true whether the battle is waged in the courts by the De-
partment of Justice or a private litigant, or in an administrative proceeding
of the FTC. The popular belief that the judicial process is awkward,
slow and expensive, while the administrative process is fast and inex-
pensive, hardly holds true with respect to adjudicative administrative pro-
ceedings.41 Indeed, it is a debatable question whether or not the judicial
process is speedier and more efficient in some areas (and in some courts)
than a protracted administrative proceeding.42
THE END RESULT OF OLIGOPOLY
Should oligopoly become substantially entrenched in basic American
industry it might well spell the end of "the primacy of competition as the
touchstone of economic regulation. '43 Oligopoly, accompanied as it
almost invariably is with conglomerate tentacles and interlocking relation-
ships, provides the oligopolistic economic empire w, h massive com-
petitive advantages - advantages which work to exclude the "small" and
"would be" competitor from our economic system, leaving the spoils to a
few and depriving our economy of the efficiency generated by true
competition. In short, if American industry were to become basically
oligopolistic, we would have an economic system consisting substantially
of monopoly control by private industry.
It is our belief that the American people would never politically
tolerate such control. Absent effective antitrust legislation, they might
be forced to choose between two evils: socialistic control of the means of
production and distribution, or pervasive government regulation of the
presently relatively free segment of industry. We believe that the average
American desires neither; that his loyalty to a truly competitive economic
system is not merely lip service. Yet without further aid from Congress
our capitalistic system appears doomed to continue its present journey
down the road to oligopoly.
"1 See I K. DAvis, ADwmISTRATrvE LAw TnnxnsE § 1.05, at 39 n.6 (1958).
,2 See Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 1004; FTC, Rules of Prac-
tice for Adjudicative Proceedings, ORGANIZATION, PNocEDURMs AND RULES OF PRAC-
TICE, pt. 3 (1967).
,3 Penn-Central Merger and N&W Inclusion Cases. 389 U.S. 486, 501 (1968).
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MORE REGULATED INDUSTRIES NOT THE ANSWER
Before venturing suggestions concerning the type of legislation that
may be helpful in stopping the race to oligopoly, we would like to call
attention to the type of legislation which would not be helpful. We submit
that our competitive system would not be aided, but to the contrary
harmed, by entrusting antitrust problems to governmental agencies whose
primary obligations and concerns are the supervision of government
regulated industries. Nor would the extension of government regulatory
supervision to the presently free, unregulated segments of our economy
be helpful unless truly necessary to protect the public interest, for once
an industry is regulated, it need no longer compete in such basic areas as
prices and profits. It need only woo such plums from its regulatory
agency, before which the public interest in the antitrust area is frequently
neither adequately represented, nor ultimately protected. A recent example
of this result comes to light in the Supreme Court's discussion of Section
5 of the Transportation Act: 44
[Tihe policy of Congress, set forth in the Transportation Act, to consoli-
date the railroads of this Nation into a limited number of systems is a
variation from our traditional national policy, reflected in the antitrust
laws, of insisting upon the primacy of competition as the touchstone of
economic regulation. Competition is merely one consideration here.45
Moreover, regulatory agencies have typically given short shrift to safe-
guarding such competition as could remain in industries under their super-
vision.
The Supreme Court, however, has shown that it will not relinquish its
antitrust jurisdiction to an administrative agency unless the regulatory act
is specifically pervasive.46 Nor will it expand legislative exemptions from
the antitrust laws beyond their "plain coverage." 47 In United States v. El
Paso Natural Gas Company/as for example, the Court struck down a
"49 U.S.C. § 5 (1964).
I 389 U.S. at 499-501. See also Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. United States, 382
U.S. 154 (1965).
,1 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Maryland &
Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 462-67 (1960); United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959); United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U.S. 188, 197-206 (1939). See also G. Hale & R. Hale, Mergers In Regulated
Industry, 59 Nw. U.L. Rv. 49 (1964); von Mehren The Antitrust Laws and Regu-
lated Industries: the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HAiv. L. REv. 929 (1954).
'7 Case Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967).
8 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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merger which had the blessings of the Federal Power Commission. Hold-
ing that the FPC's jurisdiction was not pervasive,49 the Court ordered
"divestiture without delay," 50 reasoning that there is room for competi-
tion within regulated industries where there are "new increments of de-
mand that may emerge with an expanding population.. . ."51 Cases such
as El Paso indicate that it has indeed been well for our competitive
system that the Supreme Court has guarded its antitrust jurisdiction so
jealously.
WHAT SOLUTIONS?
Many strong roadblocks may be necessary to halt American industry's
current race to oligopoly. First, immediate stopgap legislation is needed
to provide the FTC and the Department of Justice with prior knowledge
of proposed mergers. Neither agency should have to depend upon the
press for such knowledge. The FTC has pressed for such an enactment
annually since 196452 and legislation dealing with this problem has now
been introduced in Congress.53 Sterner congressional intervention, how-
ever, may ultimately be required if oligopolistic control of American in-
dustry is to be halted.
What congressional "guidelines" are needed to halt the race to oligo-
poly? Strong congressional mandates focusing on the size of economic
enterprises appear inevitable if we are to preserve a competitive econ-
omy.54 While it is not the purpose of this article to compose or propose
specific legislation, we do suggest that regulation along the following
lines may be necessary to prevent oligopolistic control of major industries:
1. A specific limitation as to the "size" (economic assets) of any
company, including its controlled subsidiaries. Opponents of
such a proposal will, of course, protest with the time worn argu-
ment that size makes for greater efficiency. There is a wealth of
economic authority, however, teaching that there is a point of
"See id. at 655, 662.
ro Id. at 662.
r1 Id. at 660.
-See FTC, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1964, at 33 (1964); FTC, ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1965, at 35 (1965); FTC, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1966, at 43 (1966); FTC, AN-
NuAL REPORT FOR 1967, at 73 (1967).
"1See H.R. 7780, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 2511, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) (both bills introduced by Rep. Emanuel Celler).
" See J. Henaerson & W. Henderson, Will a Zaibatsu Control Our Economy?,
26 FED. BJ. 187 (1966).
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optimum scale after which efficiency decreases with additional in-
creases in size.
2. The prohibition of vertical integration by any company of a cer-
tain size. The size limit for this purpose should perhaps be some-
what less than the general size limitation suggested above.
3. The prohibition of conglomerate acquisitions when the acquiring
companies' assets would exceed a specified figure. We do not
believe that it can be reasonably maintained that the ownership of
conglomerate enterprises promotes efficiency.
4. The prohibition of interlocking management.
5. Legislation that the violation of trade regulation rules promulgated
by the FTC shall constitute a prima facie case of anticompetitive
conduct. Although the FTC has in effect announced guidelines
with respect to vertical integration in the cement 5 and food
distribution 56 industries, these policy announcements presently con-
stitute no more than a warning to the industries involved. Even
an FTC trade regulation rule promulgated after investigation,
notice and hearings is not prima facie evidence of the facts found.
However, the Commission's Rules of Practice do provide that it
may rely on a trade regulation rule in an adjudicative proceeding
to resolve a relevant issue, provided the respondent is given a
fair hearing on the applicability of the rule to the particular case.57
Expansion of the authority afforded trade regulation rule could
ease the difficult evidenciary problems.
The foregoing suggested congressional guidelines are not designed, of
course, to supplant our present antitrust laws. Traditional antitrust legis-
lation would continue to play a commanding role in many areas and in-
dustries not effected by the proposed guidelines. Moreover, the sug-
gested legislation could not and should not be undertaken lightly, since
difficult problems with transition periods, divestiture of existing oligo-
polistic economic empires (with concomitant constitutional questions)
and exceptions in areas necessary for the national defense would be
involved. Nevertheless, we believe that the overwhelming majority of
" FTC, ENFORCEMENT POLICY WITH RESPECT TO VERTICAL MERGERS IN THE
CEMENT INDUSTRY (1967).
56 FTC, ENFORCEMENT POLICY WITH RESPECT TO MERGERS IN THE FOOD DIs-
TRMUTION INDUSTRY (1967).
" FTC, General Practices pt. 1, ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES AND RULES OF
PRACTICE (1967).
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the American people retain a solid faith that free competition - a
system that has made America a beacon to those, dismal countries of
economic control - is still the world's most efficient economic system.
Every housewife who can shop in an area of competing food markets
knows well the advantages she reaps from competition. A competitive
system produces the most for all and offers the highest reward to indi-
vidual skill and effort. Thus we view askance the philosophy of a wit-
ness who testified before the Senate Small Business Committee that anti-
trust laws are "part of the American folklore" which should be allowed
to wither away. If our competitive system is allowed to wither, it is
predictable that so too will the economic power that surrounds America.
